Ukraine's bauxite imports surge 39% till Sept - raw inputs like coke go through a fragile phase

Surge in bauxite imports: Compensating for domestic disruption

In the first nine months of 2025, Ukraine imported 27.22 million tonnes of aluminium ore and concentrate (bauxite) - a 39.4 per cent rise year-on-year. The monetary value of those imports also grew, by 24.1 per cent to about USD 3.021 million.

This jump must be understood against the backdrop of domestic alumina production disruption wherein Ukraine's Mykolaiv (Nikolaev) Alumina Refinery, which historically processed imported bauxite into alumina, suspended operations after the 2022 invasion. In effect, Ukraine is now sourcing raw feedstock without fully restoring downstream refining capacity.

Dominant suppliers in 2025 were Turkey (81.98 per cent of import value), China (17.16 per cent), and Guyana (0.86 per cent). For context, in 2024, imports had already surged (77.4 per cent increase in volume) with a similar supplier profile. The trend is consistent with Ukraine increasingly remaining dependent on external bauxite sources, Turkey recently playing the primary role.

The question that arises is, for what purpose is Ukraine importing bauxite at scale while its refining plant is offline? Several possibilities exist:

• Stockpiling / strategic reserves to resume refining when security conditions improve (a far-fetched possibility given the present reality).
• Re-export or transhipment, although Ukraine reportedly did not re-export bauxite in 2025 (just as in 2024, 2023) per customs data.
• Direct supply to external smelters or intermediaries (e.g. Ukrainian firms exporting semi-processed outputs, but with processing abroad). This, however, would entail complex logistics and cross-border operations under wartime constraints.

Whatever the allocation, the sizable increase underscores how Ukraine's aluminium supply chain has been inverted from internal production to heavy dependence on raw imports.

Coke imports: A reshaped source strategy

Coke and semi-coke are essential inputs for Ukraine's steel and ferrous industries. In 2025 (January–September), Ukraine's coke imports declined 4.6 per cent in physical terms relative to the same period in 2024, reaching 491,166 tonnes. In monetary terms, the decrease was more pronounced at 10 per cent to USD 165.721 million.

A striking feature: 92 per cent of these imports (by monetary value) arrived from Poland. Other suppliers included Indonesia (5.77 per cent) and the Czech Republic (2.26 per cent). That level of concentration (from a single supplier) is remarkable, especially under wartime trade pressures.

During 2024, Ukraine had expanded coke imports by over twice the previous volume (i.e. over 100 per cent increase) compared to 2023, with Poland accounting for 84.76 per cent of the import value. However, 2025's slight contraction suggests either demand weakening, substitution from domestic sources (if any), or logistical constraints.

By August 2025 alone, Ukraine imported 68,840 tonnes of coke, a 69.9 per cent increase month-on-month, and up 6.4 per cent year-on-year. That monthly surge, despite the annual decline, may reflect spot restocking or supply disruptions earlier in the year.

The dominance of Poland as a source likely reflects geographic proximity, secure land routes, and trade alignment. But it also introduces supply risk: any stumbling block in the Polish corridor could severely stress Ukrainian steel capacity.

Ukraine's metals production, the US minerals deal & structural reset

In 2024, metals and metal products accounted for USD 4.4 billion, or roughly 11 per cent of Ukraine's total exports of USD 41.6 billion. But this is down from earlier eras: Ukraine's metals exports once formed a more robust fraction of total exports pre-war.

The war inflicted sharp damage:

• Steel production collapsed from 21.4 million tonnes in 2021 to 7.6 million tonnes in 2024.
• Coal production (vital for metallurgical coke) fell precipitously - from 64.9 million tonnes in 2013 to 23.3 million tonnes in 2023.
• Some key ferroalloy plants have shut or operate at minimal rates; e.g. silicomanganese output down 45 per cent, ferromanganese down 66.5 per cent in 2024.
• Ukraine holds reserves in lithium, graphite, titanium, etc., but these remain underdeveloped.
• Around 40 per cent of Ukraine's metal resources lie in territory under Russian occupation.

To catalyse recovery, in May 2025, Ukraine and the US signed a minerals deal giving US firms preferential access to Ukrainian projects. A special fund was established on May 23, financed by revenues from new mining licenses, to channel capital into the sector.

Kyiv aims to scale up mining of critical minerals, aligning with US interest in diversifying away from China. The investment potential is pegged at USD 12–15 billion through 2033.

Some project highlights:

• Lithium: Ukraine has reserves estimated at 500 thousand tonnes, which would stand for 1.7 per cent of global reserves.
• Titanium / Ilmenite: The re-privatised UMCC Titanium restarted operations in mid-2024, supplying 110,000 tonnes of ilmenite concentrate to U.S. and European buyers in January-September 2024.
• Graphite: In 2024, Ukraine produced 1,200 tonnes (0.08 per cent of global output). The Balahovskoe Graphite deposit is under pre-feasibility evaluation.
• Rare earths: Though no active rare-earth mining exists yet, Ukraine holds deposits of 22 of the EU's 34 critical minerals.

Strategic implications & risks

Given the data trends, several strategic and operational insights (and dangers, as well) arise.

Ukraine's trajectory is shifting from a vertically integrated metals economy to one substantially reliant on imported raw materials. Bauxite, coke, and iron ore are all increasingly externally sourced. This raises costs (transport, risk premium), weakens value retention, and diminishes sovereign control over upstream inputs.

The concentration in supply routes is acute, with coke imports sourced approximately. 92 per cent from Poland and over 80 per cent of bauxite imports coming from Turkey.

These represent chokepoints. Any disruption, be it a logistics breakdown, border closure, or security escalation, could cascade through Ukrainian metallurgy.

Even as Ukraine imports raw inputs, the domestic capacity to process them has atrophied. This disconnects risks lock-in to low-value trade flows: exporting raw feeds or importing refined goods rather than rebuilding processing capability. The minerals deal with the US must be structured to promote downstream value-addition, not just raw extraction.

Alongside, with 40 per cent of resource territory under Russian occupation, resource control is a key battlefield. Projects in strategically located deposits may become politically contested. Furthermore, unstable zones may deter investment or make operations costly.

Summing up with an outlook

Ukraine's metals and raw-materials sector is now in a hybrid state: heavily import-dependent, partially stagnant in downstream processing, and ambitiously pivoting toward foreign investment-led revival.

If the US-Ukraine minerals deal is properly carried through, Ukraine could attract tens of billions of capital, revitalise critical mineral extraction, and recapture value chain segments (lithium batteries, titanium, rare earths). But success hinges on mitigating supply concentration risks, re-establishing secure transport corridors, and overcoming regulatory and war-related instability.

In 2026-2027, the key axes to watch:

Will Ukraine resume alumina refining (and rebuild Mykolaiv)?

Can it diversify coke and bauxite suppliers beyond Poland and Turkey?

How many mineral projects (lithium, graphite, rare earth) will reach production?

Will export markets (like Turkey or the EU) restore demand for Ukrainian raw materials?

Can investor confidence hold in the face of war uncertainties?

The coming years will define whether Ukraine's resource sector becomes a reconstructive engine or a stranded raw-material appendage.